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Health management (HM) technologies have been employed for safety critical system for 
decades, but a coherent systematic process to integrate HM into the system design is not yet 
clear. Consequently, in most cases, health management resorts to be an after-thought or 
‘band-aid’ solution. Moreover, limited guidance exists for carrying out systems engineering 
(SE) on the subject of writing requirements for designs with integrated vehicle health 
management (IVHM). It is well accepted that requirements are key to developing a 
successful IVHM system right from the concept stage to development, verification, 
utilization, and support. However, writing requirements for systems with IVHM capability 
have unique challenges that require the designers to look beyond their own domains and 
consider the constraints and specifications of other interlinked systems. In this paper we 
look at various stages in the SE process and identify activities specific to IVHM design and 
development. More importantly, several relevant questions are posed that system engineers 
must address at various design and development stages. Addressing these questions should 
provide some guidance to systems engineers towards writing IVHM related requirements to 
ensure that appropriate IVHM functions are built into the system design. 
I. Introduction 
he term Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) describes a set of health management (HM) 
capabilities integrated into a system’s design that enable sustainable and safe operation of components and 
subsystems within vehicle platforms. For some systems such as deep space robotic spacecraft systems health 
management, the focus is on fault management (FM)1 with safety and reliability goals during operation. For others, 
such as aircraft, terrestrial vehicles, or long duration serviceable space platforms, the emphasis is on improving 
uptime and maintaining safety during system life cycle. For those systems, HM includes accommodation of both 
faults and effects of normal wear due to usage and ageing. The discussion in this paper addresses both safety and 
maintainability objectives.  Despite significant advances in HM technologies and their application in flight-critical 
operations over the last few decades, commercial success stories of HM are relatively few2. System engineers and 
designers have to use knowledge gained from experience or adapted from other processes rather than through an 
established system engineering (SE) process. The engineering  ‘discipline’ of health management is not well 
recognized in most organizations and hardly practiced  consistently within the same organization1, 2. In many cases 
the top level requirements for IVHM are themselves so vague that systems engineers struggle to define the scope 
and functions of HM. In the past, it was, therefore, not uncommon that design for HM suffered from several 
shortcomings. These included, for example, that designers did not identify the right stakeholders; customer needs 
were not properly articulated; the link of top level requirements to the design rationale including a cost-benefit-
analysis were missing; the flow-down to lower level requirements was not well established; and, the links to other 
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SE processes (such as verification and validation (V&V), architecture design, program milestones, and so on) were 
not clearly defined early on in the design-phase. It is not surprising that most, if not all, of the recently fielded 
examples of HM fall into the category of retrofitting piecewise solutions implemented on need basis within a 
multitude of constraints. These usually result in very high costs that are far from optimal when compared to a system 
design with built-in health management functions. 
As HM technologies continue to mature there has been a rise in the number of efforts where aerospace 
professionals have come together to carve out standardized processes or systematic guidelines for IVHM design 
within system development. Ranging from workshops and conference meetings to reference texts2, 3 and standards 
documents, a lot of information about IVHM theory and practice is being formalized. For instance, SAE’s HM-1 
technical committee has the charter to develop standards documents on Aerospace IVHM. These documents 
endeavor to distill the practical experience from industry such that they give engineers and program managers 
guidance on the elements of IVHM that they need to consider for designing and operating a system. Similarly, there 
has been a concerted effort within NASA to organize fault management practice by way of fault management 
workshops4 and development of a fault management handbook5. It is well understood that coming up with good 
requirements for IVHM early on during systems design phase would be the most effective towards its 
implementation. One of the proposed SAE documents is an aerospace recommended practice (ARP6883) that is 
being developed.  This aerospace recommended practice will describe all the steps of requirements generation and 
management as it applies to IVHM systems, and demonstrate these with “real-world” examples6. Earlier works have 
explored the requirement flowdown for IVHM from high level user objectives7, 8 that will allow upfront assessment 
of IVHM complexity commensurate with mission objectives and scope9. Furthermore, it is also realized that it is not 
only important to establish the product requirements but also process requirements to actually realize a truly 
integrated HM system as opposed to a ‘band-aid’ HM system5, 10. The project management structure should regard 
IVHM engineering as an activity on its own with clear roles and responsibilities, formal documentation for design, 
implementation, and reviews of IVHM, upfront resource allocation, and adequate planning for IVHM testing and 
validation9. 
Systems with IVHM capability have unique challenges that require the designer to look beyond their own 
domain and consider the constraints and specifications of other interlinked systems. There is a strong need to clearly 
identify and lay out a process that gives engineers and program managers crisp guidance on all the elements of 
IVHM that they need to consider before designing a system. This paper presents a view on how IVHM design and 
development should be included in the overall system design. Details specific to IVHM design and development are 
provided for each of these system level steps. A brief overview of SE processes, followed in various government 
and commercial organizations, is presented in Section II by mapping similar steps onto a common process and then 
describing IVHM specific activities. Section III then enumerates specific activities during the concept and 
exploratory stages, which define the goals for IVHM and lay the foundation for IVHM requirements. Development 
of IVHM ConOps is described in Section IV. Special emphasis is given to the activity of requirements-development 
for correct and a complete set of requirements in Section V, which lays the foundation of a well-built engineering 
system. Deriving ‘good’ requirements is the key in this process since a requirements-document is referenced 
throughout the development cycle and becomes the basis of verification and validation activities at all stages. 
Several relevant questions are posed that system engineers must address at various design and development stages to 
ensure that appropriate IVHM functions are built into the system design. Therefore, as discussed later, moving from 
‘exploratory stage’ to ‘concept of operation’ and developing ‘system requirements’, it is argued that if the relevant 
questions are identified and answered early on, the chances of a successful outcome are greatly enhanced. This paper 
sheds some light on the topic of which questions to ask and at what stage.  
II. The Systems Engineering Process as Applied to IVHM 
 
The intent of this section is not to reinvent the wheel as far as SE is concerned. Several references11-13  expound 
the general principles of SE. The intent here is to concentrate on the IVHM requirements writing process by reusing 
as many methods from SE as needed to make the integration of HM into a system’s design a seamless process. This 
paper assumes that IVHM functions are being developed as part of the aerospace system and hence the IVHM 
specific SE tasks are a part of overall SE for that system.  
A. Context – Where Does IVHM Fit in a System’s Development Program? 
There is often a debate whether IVHM should be regarded as a subsystem of a system or a function of a system 
(Figure 1)14 both from implementation architecture point of view and program management point of view. A 
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significant difference practically becomes evident in the program structure and how IVHM specific development 
and activities get managed. Due to its unique distributed nature it becomes a critical question to answer and if not 
crystallized early on could lead to poor implementation of IVHM.  
Unlike other subsystems, such as structure, propulsion, avionics, etc., which can be developed and tested 
separately given specifications in interface control documents (ICDs), IVHM development has to be integrated into 
each of the monitored subsystems. It is, therefore, a crosscutting function with a distributed implementation such 
that it monitors different subsystems and components by collecting data from spatially distributed sensors and, in 
some cases, processing information in a distributed manner as well. Therefore, it does not quite fit the usual picture 
of a consolidated subsystem with a centralized teaming structure. Furthermore, it requires IVHM engineers to be 
fairly familiar with the subsystem design and function. However, from the SE perspective, treating IVHM as a 
subsystem allows allocating requirements and responsibilities to a dedicated health management team led by an 
IVHM lead engineer (Figure 1(a)). The IVHM team, in this case, must interface very closely with the individual 
subsystem teams. Additionally, the IVHM team must also interface and coordinate well with the organization’s 
safety assurance team that maintains an oversight of program wide safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality 
assurance policies and procedures. Specifically, there are potential overlaps in activities such as FMECAs, fault tree 
analyses, and other risk analyses that must be coordinated. Some of the programmatic risks can be alleviated through 
program management structure. For example, a large portion of success in Boeing 777’s IVHM implementation was 
attributed to the fact that the chief mechanic (top IVHM stakeholder) was elevated to the same approval level as the 
chief engineer15.  
 
 
Figure 1. (a) IVHM as a subsystem within system engineering. (b) IVHM as a capability residing within 
multiple subsystems of a system. 
 On the other hand, IVHM can be regarded as a set of functions or capabilities16 that other subsystems ought to 
possess to ensure safety, reliability, and maintainability (Figure 1(b)). This expands the scope of design and 
development of individual subsystems and requires dedicated HM engineers as part of respective subsystem 
development teams. Here each subsystem team must include an IVHM expert to guide IVHM design. There may not 
be a lead IVHM engineer for the overall system and each of the subsystem leads owns the IVHM requirements. 
There is a danger that this could result in unclear/incomplete system level IVHM requirements. A lack of dedicated 
leadership of overall IVHM may lead to overlaps and inconsistencies in IVHM terminology, design, 
implementation, and validation9. Therefore, care must be taken and a crisp program structure (with well defined 
reporting and work breakdown structure) should be put in place especially for IVHM development. The importance 
of getting an early buy-in from the program management and allocation of adequate test time cannot be emphasized 
enough. 
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Figure 2. Classification of requirements for SE. 
 
Irrespective of which view is taken, IVHM SE process is a subset of the overall SE process. Therefore, IVHM 
requirements are part of overall system requirements. Requirements are typically divided into functional 
requirements (FR) and non-functional requirements (NFR) categories (see Figure 2). Functional requirements define 
the function of a system whereas non-functional requirements define the attributes (such as safety, reliability, 
maintainability, usability, performance, security, etc.) of the system. As shown in Figure 3, the high level 
requirements for IVHM trace back to non-functional requirements of the overall system, such as maintainability, 
safety, and reliability requirements. IVHM requirements then can be further broken down into corresponding FRs 
(monitoring, diagnosis, prognosis, mitigation, etc.), and NFRs (metrics such as allowable false positives (FP), false 
negatives (FN), and desired accuracy, fault coverage, etc.). Therefore, the high level (HL) goals for the system that 
call for IVHM system development are considered as the starting points for IVHM concepts. An overview of the SE 
process is provided next with an emphasis on IVHM specific activities that must be carried out during a system’s 
development. 
 
 
Figure 3. Derivation of IVHM requirements from system requirements. 
B. The Systems Engineering Process 
Various government agencies and commercial organizations use slightly different but similar definitions for 
stages in the life cycle of a system. Although these stages differ in detail or terminology they all follow a similar 
sequential process with core systems engineering activities of definition, development, utilization, and retirement. 
For instance, the high level SIMILAR SE process12, as described by the INCOSE organization, is juxtaposed to the 
ISO’s generic lifecycle13 in Figure 4 to show that the two map on to each other well with slight change in scope of 
definitions for each of these stages. Processes from other organizations such as NASA, US Department of Defense, 
and US Department of Energy as well as non-governmental commercial entities map on these very well11. The key 
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points to note here are that the basic steps remain the same, there are often several feedback loops for iterative 
developments, and each organization may have customized processes to implement these.  
Expanding on the core Systems Engineering stages the classic V-diagram (see Figure 4) enumerates various 
tasks that need to be carried out during the development of a system. These tasks map directly onto the Concept, 
Development, and Production stages in the system lifecycle and form the basis for requirements development 
process.  
 
Figure 4: A generic approach to system engineering process (adapted from INCOSE12 and ISO13) and a mapping to V-
diagram depicting core systems engineering steps between the concept and production stages. 
In the remainder of this section, we briefly present each stage of the SE process shown in the V-diagram within 
Figure 2 while focusing on IVHM-specific aspects. It is understood that IVHM SE process and documents will be 
part of overall SE process and feed into system level activities during execution of the overall project management 
activities such as planning, allocation, reviews, approvals, and commissioning. 
Exploratory Stage: The Exploratory Stage is where programs and/or projects document the need to develop the 
intended IVHM system and explore possible options. This involves identifying the stakeholders and needs for 
IVHM; defining the scope of the IVHM system; identifying the various interfaces between components of the 
IVHM and with the vehicle for which the IVHM is being developed; and, understanding the available systems 
health data (both on-board and off-board data, as well as reference data), among others. Section III describes the key 
activities involved in the exploratory stage in greater detail. 
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Concept of Operation: In this stage, the concept of operations (ConOps) document for IVHM is developed. The 
ConOps document describes the characteristics of the IVHM system from the user’s point of view. This document 
describes the quantitative and qualitative system characteristics for all the stakeholders. This document can contain 
use cases to describe the interactions between the user and the IVHM system to achieve the goals. The ConOps 
development stage is described in detail in Section IV.  
Systems Requirements: Derived from the ConOps document, high-level system requirements include 
functional requirements (i.e., what the system must do) and also the non-functional requirements for performance 
(safety, availability, etc.), and cost (see Figure 3). High level system requirements then flow down to requirements 
for maintaining vehicle health adequate to perform the missions. They can flow from safety, cost, performance 
branches above and together influence HM design. From HM perspective these are still high level requirements and 
the exact design of HM is not yet there. Requirements at this level stay at the level of specifying reliability, 
maintainability, and availability without compromising safety in general. They sometimes include cost requirements 
pertaining to loss, incomplete missions, unscheduled maintenance, downtime, etc. It is important to note that in 
many cases the primary reason for an IVHM system is to provide a margin of design assurance for system shortfalls 
that cannot be cost effectively designed out. Next, it is also necessary to establish the means for testing and 
verification that the requirements are met. This often results in testability requirements17, which may flowdown to 
requirements for building simulation models, testbeds, built-in-test modules, and additional test assets to be used 
during verification step. Traditionally, IVHM requirements have not been finalized until system specification and 
design is complete. However that takes away IVHM’s ability to influence system design for a more optimal solution. 
Therefore, it is argued that IVHM requirements must be developed in tandem with system requirements and should 
participate in the system requirements review. It is expected that the requirements at this stage will be at high level 
to support program objectives5. Since detailed IVHM requirements depend upon complete specification of the 
vehicle design, the requirements are updated iteratively until the final system design is locked down for critical 
design review. Further changes in IVHM requirements should be facilitated through a predefined change 
management process as new needs or constraints are identified18. Section V discusses more details about developing 
requirements for IVHM systems.  
High Level System Design: High level IVHM system design decomposes the IVHM system into its subsystems 
based on various functions that are required to carry out high level mission objectives. The decomposition is based 
on allocation of reliability, availability, and maintainability requirements to various subsystems such as propulsion, 
power, avionics, and structure. Further, it may be defined what level of HM would be appropriate to meet these 
requirements. Specifically, an IVHM system may be conceptualized at high level indicating what it will do – 
diagnosis, prognosis, real-time decision support, decision making for logistics, or all of the above, etc. While it still 
does not lay out exact details at software and hardware implementation level, the functional roles and interactions of 
the IVHM modules are well defined in the system design. This also includes the design of test platforms with fault 
injection capability both off-board and on-board the vehicle system, often termed as design for testability to increase 
the overall observability of the system17. 
Detailed System Design: The SE process is recursive in nature and can be applied to lower level subsystems all 
over again in order to come up with detailed design for the decomposed system in the previous step. It is at this level 
that IVHM design becomes a dedicated activity. Detailed design identifies which subsystems or components to 
focus on, data requirements, sensing requirements, processing requirements, interface requirements, etc. IVHM is a 
distributed system such that it monitors various different subsystems and components by collecting data from 
spatially distributed sensors and in some cases processing information in a distributed manner as well (unless 
implemented as a centralized system14). Therefore, it connects to the system through several interfaces at the 
subsystem and/or component levels. Often times IVHM takes advantage of synergies with other system 
instrumentation, but may influence the system design or add its own instrumentation if a need is determined. This 
requires detailed safety analyses such as failure mode and effects analysis or failure mode, effects, and criticality 
analysis, hazard and operability studies, reliability analysis, etc. to determine targets for health management and 
come up with suitable IVHM alternatives. Furthermore, the end use of IVHM output is expected to influence IVHM 
architecture and how it communicates with different stakeholders. IVHM design must comply with constraints 
arising from the overall system design and operational requirements. For instance specifications for sampling rates, 
model fidelity, computational complexity, sensor resolution, and power requirements, etc. should be all determined 
from the requirements flowed down from the higher levels. 
System Implementation: This step is the core of actual product realization activity. System implementation 
involves implementing both hardware and software. While various low level components/systems may be developed 
independently they must comply with interface requirements. Representative data or prototype mockups may be 
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made available to each other between any two interfacing elements as outlined in the detailed system design. An 
IVHM system will include implementing hardware and software for accounting for relevant sensors, signal 
conditioning, signal processing, and health management (diagnostic and prognostic) algorithms. Each basic building 
block identified in the detailed design phase mentioned above are realized by either procuring it, or building it, or 
reusing it. The requirements and specifications flowing from the top levels are kept in consideration while making 
choices from among several alternatives. Therefore, it is this phase where choices are made for models, algorithms, 
model fidelity, time constraints, etc and where they are implemented. These choices also guide the methods to test 
and verify these implementations at the individual level so that the top level integrated product will likely meet the 
“shall” statements that were allocated, derived, or generated for it. Thus low level requirements on performance are 
derived and implemented here.  
Unit/Component Level Test: Testing or verification is performed for each of the low level components or 
IVHM subsystem implementations. Verification consists of implementing a set of processes that assure the designer 
that the system is designed correctly, i.e. that it functions according to the requirements. Note that unit/component 
level verification is not the verification of the final IVHM system. However, using analysis, simulation, models or 
other means to test products at this level shows that they are implemented correctly, meet requirements, and are 
likely to integrate into a successful system.  This also allows identifying important areas and drafting verification 
procedures for them to be used during overall system verification. Low level performance tests developed during 
detailed system design step are carried out for corresponding components and/or subsystems. Simulated or 
experimental data may be obtained to build test scenarios. For instance, for a contingency management based IVHM 
system fault detection and failure prediction algorithms may be tested using experimental testbeds equipped with a 
fault injection capability using appropriate metrics19-21. Fault injection must be designed to represent actual faults 
encountered during operation that were also determined during detailed design phase through FMECA and other 
fault analyses. Separate algorithms, sensors, and data processing approaches may be used for different type of 
components that will be tested separately at this stage. Likewise, if there are hardware implementations such as 
sensor selection and placement, signal conditioning, data processing, etc they should be tested for desired 
specifications. While verification at the lowest level is not sufficient for the verification at the next level it is a 
necessary step before individual parts can be integrated. 
Subsystem Level Verification: Components and modules verified at the previous level are now integrated and 
tested to carry out verification at the subsystem level. This is an iterative step and is repeated whenever two or more 
subsystems are integrated together22. During this step major subsystems of a system are incrementally tested and 
verified. All major subsystems as identified in the high level design must be verified against requirements at that 
level. In the IVHM context algorithms may be integrated with respective hardware, data acquisition, and display 
interfaces. Verification at this level requires correct sequence of information flow as well in correct temporal order. 
It is tested whether health management algorithms implemented for different subsystems and components are 
performing their functions independently. For instance it is desired that a health management module for a specific 
component does not get affected by faults in other subsystem. Therefore, interference due to other subsystems is also 
determined and corrected for during the integration testing. Further, the process for fusing subsystem level health 
information to come up with overall system health is tested along with decision making routines. 
System Verification: During this step the IVHM is tested within the integrated system based on the verification 
plan that lists what requirements are to be tested at what level of integration. Verification methods, as noted earlier, 
are determined upfront to include development/procurement of supporting test platforms and tools that must be built 
to carry out testing. Tests are carried out by simulating a relevant environment at the system level to ensure proper 
functioning of the integrated system during off-nominal operation. Key steps involve inclusion of fault injection 
capability to test IVHM functionality without breaking the system itself. There are many scenarios where 
verification metrics based on offline tests do not suffice. In such cases verification through deployment, such as   
test-as-you-fly approach, may be needed. These methods have inherent risks of loss due to unforeseen outcomes 
from untested scenarios. To minimize losses, policies like that of controlled introduction into service may be used 
where more authority is granted to IVHM system in an incremental fashion as more trust is gained through 
controlled usage over some desired period of time23. 
System Validation and Deployment: The system is now deployed and tested in realistic environments under 
various scenarios as described in the ConOps. Validation is the process by which one proves that the system indeed 
performs to satisfy the needs of the customers, for example as codified in ConOps. Validating IVHM functions can 
be somewhat difficult. For example, if one of the requirements of an IVHM system is to increase the maintenance 
interval from 4 to 5 years, one has to find a way of validating this without having to wait five years. As another 
example, if an IVHM system is designed to monitor for a fault with a certain detection and false alarm rate, it will be 
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difficult to test this in the real world without seeding the system with actual faults. The validation, therefore, in this 
case relies heavily on simulations based testing. Other approaches such as in-service-validation for IVHM have been 
suggested that primarily take an incremental approach for trust building by allowing IVHM to participate in the 
control loop in a controlled manner23.  
Operations and Maintenance: An IVHM system is unique and different from other capabilities in the sense 
that its performance and correct functioning may not be determined for a long time. However, there should be 
assessment metrics in place that measure IVHM performance over time and in the context of IVHM it is often 
referred to as IVHM maturation phase15. IVHM parameters and thresholds may need to be fine tuned as operations 
begin and there is more information available about how the system is reacting to the operational environments. 
IVHM models may need to be updated as the system parameters change over time (due to normal wear, change in 
operational environments, etc.) or some modifications (such as due to maintenance and repair) are applied. The 
components used specifically for implementing IVHM capabilities are themselves subject to failure and, therefore, 
may require maintenance. Finally, as improved technologies become available there may be a desire to apply 
updates to the IVHM system as time goes by.  
III. Exploratory and Concept Stage 
The Exploratory and Concept of Operation involves identifying user needs, exploring various concepts that meet 
those needs, and selecting a concept solution that can be developed and tested.  To describe the situation of the past 
most of the time it is not clear to the subsystem designers how these IVHM system or resulting data will be used 
during operations and they often interpret the needs differently. This indicates that stakeholders are not always 
clearly identified, ConOps for IVHM are not crystallized, and consequently the requirements never flowdown 
adequately enough for a useful system to be developed.  
This section addresses this initial step that sets the stage for the success or failure of a useful IVHM system. It is 
for this stage that the HM community needs to instill  a culture of thinking about IVHM from the design phase. In 
order to determine what may be needed, the key issues to understand are: 
 What are the mission or program needs that IVHM can address or help in reducing programmatic and/or 
technical risks? 
 What are the relevant figures of merit for the intended mission or program and how can IVHM  contribute 
to meeting those metrics? 
 Will it be possible to realize a quantifiable ‘benefit’ within the mission/program’s duration despite 
additional costs of implementing IVHM, and how? 
To aid in answering these questions some key steps are defined next that must be carried out and used to 
document the findings into reports that will be used to get a buy in from the program management. 
 
1. Identify Stakeholders and Needs for the IVHM system 
The key to the development of good requirements is to identify the stakeholders early, and officially document 
their needs. This is one aspect in which IVHM-enabled systems differ from other systems on the aircraft, because 
just about everybody has a stake in the IVHM functions. As mentioned in the introduction, examples of IVHM 
stakeholders can be line maintenance, maintenance management, owner, operator, customer, original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM), regulatory authorities, which can be categorized from requirements perspective in the 
following manner: 
 Maintenance personnel and management (e.g. line, overhaul, MRO personnel) 
 Operator (e.g. pilot) 
 Fleet manager (e.g. mission commander) 
 Owner (e.g. airline / lease company / USAF) 
 Regulatory authorities (e.g. Airworthiness, certification) 
 General public 
 HM system integrator (e.g. Third party IVHM provider) 
 OEM (e.g. Internal integrated engineering teams developing the product) 
Each of these groups is looking for something different from the system. For example, the vehicle operator, who 
is often also the owner, is looking for fuel savings, increasing availability in the fleet, reducing turn times in the 
shops, and lowering maintenance cost, etc. The maintainer (both line and shop) is looking for parts availability, 
highest throughput, reducing no-fault-found incidences, reducing parts inventory, reducing maintenance cost, etc. If 
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the maintainer has a long-term service agreement with the customer his needs are very different from an IVHM 
system than if he only has a time & material contract with the operator or owner. The OEM and the ultimate 
customer also have stakes in the recommendations of the IVHM system. All these things have to be considered 
when developing the requirements, because they may lead to significantly different designs. While this document 
focuses on new systems, it is clear that retro-fit solutions have their own unique set of requirements of cost, weight, 
compatibility, and the need to get supplemental certification. The highest desires of the stakeholders are translated 
by the IVHM systems analyst into high level requirements. Once analyzed, these can be translated to low level (LL) 
requirements that are more specific and verifiable. 
Specifically the activities during this step should try to answer the following questions: 
 Who are the users of the system?  
 What functions of the system will be improved or feel an impact due to IVHM, and how?  
 Choice between autonomy versus human-in-the-loop and onboard versus off-board functions. 
- Will IVHM be used for automated or autonomous systems or will be of the man – machine variety 
such as engineering analysis, traditional hands on maintenance, planning and scheduling? 
 Are there potential conflicts arising from the needs of different stakeholders? 
 How are these needs prioritized to resolve such conflicts? 
2. Defining Scope of the IVHM Functions: 
Defining scope for IVHM functions is key to satisfying all relevant stakeholders and set expectations, narrow 
down and focus on prioritized fault modes, and bound the development effort. Complex systems consist of multiple 
subsystems comprising numerous components that can all develop fault modes that cannot be all feasibly or 
practically tackled by IVHM. It is therefore important to narrow down on those that are more critical from overall 
system’s point of view while writing scope statement. A Scope Statement should include the following information: 
a) Justification: Provide a justification of why IVHM is necessary in meeting system level objectives. 
 What is the intent of the system being considered?  
 What is its main purpose (priorities among safety, cost, or both)? 
b) Objectives: Define the IVHM functions – specifically the IVHM outputs and/or the IVHM action. These 
outputs can be a set of implemented actions based on prognostic estimates (autonomous functions), proposed 
alternatives, prognostic outlook, or just the current state estimate depending on the scope of IVHM’s role. 
 How will the IVHM output be used?  
 How will IVHM affect, and/or be affected by, other related system development activities? 
 Are there legacy systems with IVHM with success stories and/or lessons learned? 
c) Product scope description: Describe the features and functions of the products, services, and/or results the 
project will produce. 
 What is the Scope of the system being considered?  
 What are critical scenarios under which IVHM will be used to extend systems safety and availability?  
 Is it a real-time on-board decision support system capable of learning and adaptation or an enhancement to 
the supply chain for maintenance or logistics?  
 Will the IVHM system be mission, safety, or flight critical and how will that impact specific and general 
system requirements? 
- In addition to the reliability of the system and its components, is the criticality analysis also 
considered for any on-board development? 
- What is needed (diagnostics, prognostics, decision support, or decision making (correction, 
mitigation, or isolation), etc.)? 
 What are the budget constraints for the system within which IVHM should be developed? 
 Are IVHM requirements technically feasible within programs budget, schedule, and risk posture?  
d) Product acceptance criteria: Describe the process and criteria for accepting completed products, services, or 
results. Acceptance criteria can be defined in terms of product specifications validated by certain tests, 
demonstrations, and/or documented reports. For an IVHM-enabled system such criteria may be specified in 
terms of false positives, false negatives, timeliness, prediction horizon or similar type of metrics. These criteria 
must additionally specify the environments in which these tests would run, i.e. simulation, lab, flight, etc.  
Relevant tolerances in test results, number of tests for statistical significance, safe modes, etc. must be defined 
under acceptance criteria. 
e) Constraints: Restrictions that limit the scope of IVHM development or that limit the access to data and required 
resources. Some typical system development constraints include time and budget limits. In aerospace 
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applications, constraints also include limits on weight, volume, computational power, communication delay, 
communication protocols, data and physical access to system, etc. These system constraints have a direct 
influence on IVHM capabilities and scope. All such constraints must be identified and enumerated in the scope 
document. In general, constraints identification will try to answer the following question: 
 How does accessibility to the target subsystem/component influence the requirement development process?  
 What other systems and data access will have to be considered?  
 Will there be single or multiple users with read/write access and the necessity to establish publish/subscribe 
protocols?  
 Another consideration similar to access is availability. How often and for how long will access be required 
to the host subsystems? 
f) Assumptions: Assumptions need to be listed to communicate expectations and limitations to other stakeholders. 
Consider the situation when IVHM development is carried out as a parallel activity with inputs from system 
development and access to a fully functional system is not yet possible. In such cases IVHM development will 
be based on an understanding of how a system would operate nominally and under various faults that are 
candidates for HM. All assumptions should be listed that describe the model of the system as seen by IVHM, 
interactions, availability of data, noise levels, communications, operational conditions (for functions active 
during operation), hardware capabilities, assurance of software and hardware integrity, etc. The other source of 
assumptions is in estimating uncertainties in future operating conditions, changes in system and/or system 
ConOps, changes in intended use of IVHM output or operational procedures, etc. Assumptions that deal with 
such uncertainties should be identified and documented.  
3. Identify interfaces for IVHM system 
Interfaces identify various interactions that would take place in an IVHM equipped system. This would include 
interfaces between the system and the various elements of IVHM such as sensors, communications, control system, 
displays, etc. Typical interfaces are data interfaces between software modules, between data acquisition and state 
estimations algorithms, and further between state estimation and decision/planning modules. Interfaces identification 
relevant to IVHM systems should try to answer the following questions: 
 What Interfaces are encompassed by the scope of IVHM? 
 Does the system operate with on-board hardware, pass data to off-board systems, link to sustainment and 
finance databases, or other logistic and supply chain data collection systems? 
 Can IVHM access data from bus supporting core system functions? 
 Are system related sensing and operational environment data available to IVHM? 
 What are the compatibility considerations?  
 Is the system updateable and will contemplated future systems be accommodated?  
 What standards have to be met and what means and methods will be used to link to other data systems?  
 Which subsystems or components IVHM will monitor? 
 Will IVHM system be a part of a control loop? 
 Who will be the users of IVHM output and how will this output be made available to them (displays, alarms, 
databases, etc.)? 
When considering interfaces, one must strive to use the interface to improve access to data through a common 
universal format which is scalable and enables multi-disciplinary users to analyze data to discover invaluable 
information. 
 Interface Examples – On-board systems, off-board systems, maintenance systems, planning systems, data 
warehouse, logistics, finance systems, OEMs, acquisition, HR, research environments, and other services. 
 Interface Documentation – Documentation of interfaces should be done via interface control documents / 
specifications, architecture drawings, data flow diagrams, sequence diagrams, data mapping diagrams, and 
example data. 
4. Data Inventory 
Current inventory health management system developers must first understand the available systems health data and 
interfaces. Vehicle health management data come, in general, from on-board and off-board sources. Reference data 
are also essential. 
 On-board Data Sources - Operational data (e.g. flight phase, status, or other discrete signals), parametric 
data (e.g. air speed, angle of attack, timing, etc.), and fault data (e.g. fault and maintenance codes, BIT 
codes, etc.) 
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 Off-board Data Sources - Maintenance data (e.g. maintenance actions, pilot or crew reports, part installation 
and removal information, etc.), test stand data (e.g. test stand test limit reference data, test summary reports, 
etc.), and unstructured data (e.g. bore scope or other hand-held inspection system data). 
 Reference Data - System and subsystem organizational structure (e.g. Work Unit Code, ATA), engineering 
units (e.g. knots, psi, degrees F), on-board and off-board data recorder configurations, hardware and 
software versions, calibration / correction / conversion other metadata info and a data dictionary including 
domain-specific semantic information. 
IV. Concept of Operations and Use Cases for IVHM 
A Concept of Operations (ConOps) is a document that describes the characteristics of a system from the user’s 
point of view24. This document describes the quantitative and qualitative system characteristics to all the 
stakeholders. This document can contain use cases to describe the interactions between the user and the system to 
achieve the goals. The concept of “use cases” forms a strong basis for developing requirements.  
The ConOps begin as a thought exercise, where utility of novel ideas are explored though various scenarios in 
which a system would operate and benefit from the new concepts. The level of details in the scenario should be just 
enough to come up with need statements. The ConOps document can be iteratively revised as more insights are 
gained in the development phase. The ConOps are a means to communicate our understanding of the needs with all 
stakeholders. An overall system ConOps document is expected to include ConOps for IVHM module, which 
describes the functions of IVHM in situations with/without fault conditions in the system. The ConOps document 
should describe both normal and abnormal operations of the system 
Use Cases are also the results of thought experiments. However, they are somewhat more detailed than the 
ConOps document. They describe, in specific detail, how the system is going to be used by the users. The key to 
developing a useful use case is to identify the user (or the actor) and his or her actions on the system. They describe 
the nominal operating case as well as the abnormal (or alternate) operating cases.  
For example, the ConOps document might state that: “The system will be able to take off in normal and 
abnormal environmental conditions. It will also be able to take off if a single engine fails during takeoff.” The use 
cases associated with this ConOps might be far more detailed. It would describe exactly what normal conditions are. 
It will describe a set of abnormal conditions including temperature, altitude, rain and ice, and head and cross wind 
parameters. It might go into all the possible faults that can occur during take off that need to be designed for, etc. 
Since the general concepts are similar, we will use these terms interchangeably in the course of this paper. The key 
is to make sure that the set of requirements that result from these thought experiments are correct and complete.  
As we stated earlier, the overall ConOps document for systems equipped with IVHM, can be divided into two 
main parts.   
1. The first part of the system ConOps document describes a typical nominal system operational scenario. 
Since no health concerns are present for the system the IVHM is expected to continue monitoring the 
system and make sure no interference is caused in the nominal system functions. Therefore, this describes 
system operations when no health concerns are present. This would include IVHM output that would be 
considered indicative of healthy system and no false positives resulting in unnecessary concerns and/or 
actions. 
2. The second part of ConOps/Use Cases should describe the IVHM function when the system experiences a 
fault or abnormal condition. The IVHM output, corresponding set of actions, its interactions with the 
system, and expected consequences should be described at a generalized level. If the IVHM response is 
expected to be similar for all possible fault modes a single scenario description would suffice, otherwise, 
ConOps/Use Cases should include description for each category of contingencies. If it is expected that 
IVHM function evolves with system life cycle or is different in different modes of operation, all such 
scenarios should be described. Various different stages to be considered could be system development, 
integration, test and verification, operations, training, maintenance, upgrades, etc. However, the most 
important stage that needs description is operations17. Furthermore, ConOps/Use Cases should describe 
scenarios from all key stakeholders’ point of view to make use all IVHM users are satisfied with its 
functionality.  For IVHM such users are typically maintainers, managers, operators, and regulatory bodies, 
etc. 
ConOps relevant to IVHM will try to answer the following questions: 
 Who are IVHM stakeholders and what are their viewpoints? 
 How would these stakeholders use IVHM output in their actionable decisions? 
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 What are the operational modes (both nominal and off-nominal) of the system under which IVHM will 
operate? 
 What are the IVHM nominal (and off-nominal) operational modes and how they affect system safety? 
 How would IVHM function in presence of system fault?  
 How is IVHM expected to interact with the system (i.e. inflow & outflow of information)?  
 Will the IVHM system control hazards, and/or maintain safety, and/or protect assets? 
Ultimately, ConOps and Use Cases are used to derive system requirements. When considering intent and scope, 
the details of the Concepts of Operation are a significant element and affect much of the preparation for requirement 
development. Therefore the more details are added in ConOps/Use Cases, the more coverage of requirements can be 
achieved. All assumptions should be clearly stated. If during the development stage any assumption is found to be 
incorrect, then the ConOps/Use Cases may need to change; and, therefore, corresponding requirements may change 
as well.  
Another important aspect of requirement development is that is it essentially a collaborative process. 
Consequently many organizations and information sources must be prepared to participate in requirements 
generation and it is extremely important to establish the procedures for coordination upfront. Following categories 
must be considered. 
 Resource availability – The supporting resources for the program must be taken into account and vetted 
through the responsible organization and all support functions as well. Resources include in some cases, 
facilities, finances and equipment. Additional considerations that may come from support elements include 
computation and data resources. 
 Schedule – As health management is often a multi-disciplinary enterprise, it also tends to be multi-
organizational. As a result, independent scheduling and tasking need coordination and an upfront 
understanding of program resources. 
 Coordination – The primary element of coordination is frequent and unambiguous communications. But in 
addition, contributing elements are: a clear statement of work and schedules, well understood and mutually 
agreeable contract terms and conditions, well-understood roles and responsibilities, working sessions and 
technical interchanges, collaborative tools, information exchange processes, and a common technical and 
systems domain knowledge. 
V. Systems Requirements  
It is after the concept phase when a complete set of system requirements including those of an IVHM system 
should be derived from the ConOps already established. These requirements, if done well, allow an effective IVHM 
development management with assurance of meeting customer needs and expectation. In addition to product 
requirements some of the requirements are associated with management and administration of the system 
development, where budget and schedules are developed, the management team is created, and legal and reporting 
requirements are identified15. Such requirements are referred to as process or program requirements in this paper and 
discussed briefly later.  
 
A. Product Requirements 
Product requirements define what the IVHM system will do. Based on the ConOps document high level system 
requirements are usually functional requirements (i.e., what the system must do). These requirements also include 
performance requirements (safety, availability, etc.), and cost. High level system requirements then flow down to 
requirements for maintaining vehicle health adequate to perform the missions. They can flow from safety, cost, 
performance branches above and together influence HM. From HM perspective these are still high level since exact 
design of HM is not yet there. From an IVHM point of view, system requirements at this level stay at the level of 
specifying reliability, maintainability, and availability requirements without compromising safety in general and 
sometimes include cost requirements (pertaining to loss, incomplete missions, unscheduled maintenance, downtime, 
etc.). Industry experience reveals that lack of a systematic methodology to come up with IVHM requirements 
upfront has led to vague and incomplete requirements. This forces the lower level subsystems to make assumptions 
in interpreting those requirements and pose system level risks of cost, schedule, safety, and robustness.  
This step will try to answer the following questions relevant to IVHM:  
 Which components and fault/failure modes will be addressed by IVHM? 
 Are IVHM functions defined for each of the candidate subsystems/components? 
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 Are requirements between flight (airborne) and ground operations distinguished and specified for vehicle 
(launch and flight) and payload separately? 
 Are requirements for portable maintenance aids and maintenance management covered? 
 Are performance specifications for all IVHM functions specified with margins? 
 What are the tolerances around IVHM function outputs? Are these flowed down from top level mission 
objectives and properly specified at the lower level? 
 Are all interfaces, identified earlier, covered? 
- Are all hardware and software interfaces defined?  
- Are communication, command, and control interfaces defined? 
- Are test and operational interfaces such as GUIs, data reports, alarms, warnings, etc. defined? 
 Are IVHM function maintainability requirements included? 
- Calibration, updates, upgrades, etc. 
 What are the requirements for IVHM test capabilities to enable fault injection for verification and 
validation?  
 Are non-functional system requirements considered in the IVHM requirements? 
- Are requirements related to aspects like security considered?  
- Specifically, are topics like information sensitivity, data rights and proprietary information, and the 
requirements and procedures of classification included? 
 Are all requirements allocated? 
B. Process/Program Requirements 
In addition to developing product requirements that define ‘what is needed’ it is also critical to define the set of 
milestones, roles and responsibilities, mode of interaction between different subsystem teams, timeline, deliverables, 
reviews, and acceptance procedures.  IVHM is developed by multi-organizational teams including external 
contractors, and therefore, development of a cross-functional and inter-organizational  program management plan is 
extremely important to support the execution of an effective IVHM development15. Specifically, these requirements 
will determine the IVHM project management structure and answer the following questions: 
 Do all IVHM product requirements trace back to the mission concept and risk assumptions outlined in the 
ConOps? 
 Is there an IVHM design and development team in place? What is the structure of the team? 
 How does the lead IVHM engineer interface with the lead systems engineer and other subsystem leads? 
 Are IVHM requirements allocated properly to respective subsystems/components? 
 What is the timeline for IVHM requirements, design, and development and respective decision gates and 
reviews? 
 What are various formal documents that need to be maintained and produced? 
- For reference (e.g. ConOps document, requirements document, design document, etc.), 
- For analysis (e.g. FMECA, hazard analysis, risk analysis, fault tree analysis, etc.), 
- For evaluation (fault/failure scenario tests and test procedures, incompressible test list, verification 
and validation reports, acceptance criteria, etc.),  
- Approvals (verification and validation checklists, design change document, requirement waivers, 
etc.). 
 What is the process for making changes in IVHM requirements? 
- As system design takes shape exposing additional needs (such as when new failure modes are 
discovered or if new constraints arise due to implementation choices) how can the changes be made 
and tracked? 
- How are the changes due to scope, budget, and schedule adjustments accommodated? 
 Are the IVHM product requirements inclusive of requirements for system operation and maintenance and 
not just product development, i.e. how well are the end user (stakeholder) objectives addressed? 
While answers to these questions depend on the project management,  team structure, and specific mission 
types25, it is recommended that IVHM design reviews be conducted as part of overall system design reviews. From 
costing perspectives, recent industry experience calls for a separate work breakdown structure and resource 
allocation for IVHM activities starting from the concept phase9. An important process in developing good 
requirements is that requirements are flowed down, and bi-directionally traced6, 8 – this ensures that all needs are 
considered and nothing is built without a need.  
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At the end of the requirements stage, the outputs should be clearly defined product requirements with an 
understanding of mutual goals, a program management structure, and well defined and documented processes and 
tools to help successful system development and deployment. This process is explained with an example in another 
paper that discusses development of an IVHM system for an aircraft Landing Gear System (LGS)8.  
VI. Conclusion 
This paper examined the various stages in the SE process and identified activities specific to IVHM design and 
development. Important aspects of the SE process for IVHM are highlighted by asking several relevant questions 
that system engineers must address at various design and development stages. Addressing these questions should 
provide some guidance to systems engineers towards writing IVHM related requirements to ensure that appropriate 
IVHM functions are built into the system design. A discussion on programmatic requirements and management 
structure emphasizes the uniqueness and importance of IVHM system within overall system development. As such 
this paper strives to contribute to the general discussion on developing IVHM requirements and systems engineering 
process for a truly integrated health management into a systems design.  
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